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I Introduction 
  
Section 23 of the Seychelles Penal Code defines common intention as follows: 
  
“When two or more persons form a common intention to prosecute an 
unlawful purpose in conjunction with one another and in the prosecution of 
such purpose an offence is committed of such nature that its commission 
was a probable consequence of the prosecution of such purpose, each of 
them is deemed to have committed an offence.” 
  
This means that if D1 and D2 agree to commit crime X and D1, going beyond 
what was agreed to, commits crime Y, then D2 will also be guilty of crime Y if and 
only if crime Y was a probable consequence of crime X. 
  
Before analysing what “probably consequence” means it is useful to set out 
English law on that point. 
  
If D1 and D2 agree to commit crime X and D1, going beyond what was agreed to, 
commits crime Y, then D2 will also be guilty of crime Y if and only if he foresaw 
that D2 might do crime Y. (see R v A [2011] Q.B. 841) 
  
The only difference is that in our law probable consequence is required whereas in 
English law it is foresight. 
  
II Objective element 
  
The first difference is that under Seychelles law whether something is a probable 
consequence is an objective test (whereas in England the secondary crime must 
be foreseen, this is subjective). This was confirmed by the Privy Council in Furbert 
v The Queen [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1716[i]. 
  
However the determination of whether Y was a probable consequence is 
determined by taking into account of what D2 knew or did not know: Furbert v 
The Queen. 
  
Consider the following example: 
  
D1 and D2 agree to break into a house and steal. There is no agreement 
to kill anyone. In the course of the theft D1 takes a gun out and kills V. 
  
Consider two alternative scenarios: (i) D2 knew that D1 had a gun, (ii) D2 did not 
know that D1 had a gun. 
  
In (i) the killing can indeed be said to be a probable consequence. However that 
is not the case in (ii). In (i) D2 would be guilty of murder on the basis of common 
intention but in (ii) he would only be guilty of breaking and entering. 
  
English law would lead to the same result in (ii) since D2 did not know of the gun 
he could not have foreseen that D1 would kill V. In (i) it is theoretically possible 
that D2 did not foresee the killing however in practice he is likely to be convicted 
of murder on the basis of joint enterprise. 
  
III What must be a probable consequence/foreseen? 
  
According to English law what must be foreseen by A is crime Y. This means both 
theactus reus and the mens rea (if any) of Y:  R v A 
  
In Kilindo v Republic [2011] SCCA 20 the Seychelles Court of Appeal (at [22]) 
stated the position in English law following R v A as: 
  
“It appears that in England, in cases involving joint enterprise it is not sufficient 
to show that a secondary act took place as a result of the agreed first act. It must 
also be shown that the co-accused who committed the secondary act 
had intended the secondary act.” 
  
It is respectfully submitted that this is not quite accurate. What must be shown is 
that D2 (the party who did not commit the secondary act) foresaw that D1 might 
do the secondary act with the required mens rea. In the case of murder (which 
was the charge in R v A) this is indeed intention (to kill or cause grievous bodily 
harm). But if the mens rea for the secondary crime was subjective recklessness 
then foresight by D2 that D1 would act with subjective recklessness is sufficient. 
  
It is important to note that it need not be shown that D2 had mens rea of the 
secondary crime. All that needs to be shown is that D2 foresaw that D1 would 
have the mens reaof the secondary crime. 
  
The Seychelles Court of Appeal then goes on to suggest that this principle (that A 
must foresee that B would act with the required mens rea) is not part of 
Seychelles law: 
  
“[23] As I have pointed out this distinction does not arise in Seychelles because 
of the wording of section 23 of our Penal Code. If we are to use the same 
terminology as the English cases quoted above, then to put it simply the law in 
Seychelles is that it suffices to show that a secondary act took place as a 
probable consequence of the agreed first act intended. In this jurisdiction we do 
not need to look for the intention of the perpetrator to carry out the secondary 
act. All that is necessary is that the secondary act took place as a probable 
consequence of the first act to which they had agreed upon.” 
  
It is respectfully submitted that the Court of Appeal erred in saying that. Whilst it 
is true that the  requirement that D2 must foresee crime Y is not part of 
Seychelles law, the requirement that D1's commission of the actus reus of crime 
Y together with the mens rea of crime Y was a probable consequence of the 
agreed first crime X is part of Seychelles law. 
  
To hold otherwise would lead to absurd situations. Suppose D1 does the actus 
reus of Y without the mens rea of Y, then he is obviously not guilty of Y. But if his 
doing of the actus reus of Y was a probable consequence then D2 would be guilty 
of Y (on the basis of s. 23)! 
  
That B acting with the required mens rea must be a probable consequence is 
indeed clear from the wording of s. 23: “in the prosecution of such purpose 
an offence is committed of such nature that its commission was a probable 
consequence of the prosecution of such purpose”. The word offence and not 
just act is used. Offenceincludes both the actus reus and the mens rea. 
  
Granted, it will generally be the case if the actus reus was a probable 
consequence then so was the mens rea. However, this is not always the case. 
Consider the following example: 
  
D1 and D2 agree to break into a house and steal. D2 knows that the 
person in the house is an old man (V) who may have a heart attack if a 
replica gun is pointed at him, he hopes that that V will remain asleep. D1 
does not know that (and D2 knows that D1 does not know). D1 has a gun. 
D2 thinks it is a replica gun. 
  
Let us pause to see (from D2's point of view) what the probable consequences 
are. It is a probable consequence that V will wake up, that D1 will point the 
replica gun at him and that V will die from a heart attack.  This will amount to 
constructive manslaughter (R v Watson [1989] 1 W.L.R. 684).  If this does indeed 
happen then D1 would be guilty of manslaughter as a principal and D2 would also 
be guilty of manslaughter on the basis of common intention. 
  
Let us now continue with the story 
  
V wakes up and sees them. D1 fires the gun at V. It was in fact not a 
replica but a real gun, D2 thought it was a replica. 
  
D1 is clearly guilty of murder. Whilst D1 killing V was a probable consequence 
that he would do so with intent to kill was not. This is because it was a probable 
consequence (from D2's point of view) that D1 would take out a replica gun and V 
would die of fear (that would be manslaughter on D1's part as he does not have 
malice aforethought). But it was not a probable consequence (from D2's point of 
view) that D1 would shoot V with a real gun (as D2 thought D1 only had a replica 
gun). So D2 is not guilty of murder on the basis of common intention. He is 
nevertheless guilty of manslaughter, this is because every murder includes 
manslaughter and, that D1 would commit manslaughter was a probable 
consequence. 
  
  
Here is a further example: 
  
D1 and D2 agree to break into a house and steal. D1 is a very strong man. 
V is a frail old man. D1 is epileptic and can have at some occasions 
epileptic fits in which he does not know what he is doing. D2 knows that. 
  
Let us consider what the probable consequence is. It is a probable 
consequence[ii] that D1 would go into an epileptic fit and kill V in the process. 
This however would not amount to an offence because of the involuntary nature 
of D1's bodily movement. Also D1, not knowing what he is doing, is incapable of 
having mens rea. If that happens D1 would not be guilty of any further offence 
and neither would D2. 
  
D1 pretends to go into an epileptic fit and kills V intentionally. 
  
D1 is clearly guilty of murder. D1 killing V (in what looks like an epileptic fit) was 
a probable consequence but that he would do so intentionally (whilst only 
pretending to have an epileptic fit) was not. So D2 would not be guilty of murder 
on the basis of common intention. 
IV Conclusion 
  
The position in Seychelles law is for D2 to be guilty of the secondary crime Y 
(which was not agreed) it must have been a probable consequence that D1 would 
do the actus reus of Y with mens rea of Y. 
  
Any suggestion to the contrary by the Seychelles Court of Appeal in Kilindo is, it 
is respectfully submitted, wrong. In fairness to the Court it might have been that 
the choice of the word “act” in “All that is necessary is that the secondary act 
took place as a probable consequence of the first act to which they had agreed 
upon” was an unfortunate choice of word. However, the rejection of R v A is then 
unclear. 
  
It follows that when directing a jury it is insufficient to merely ask “Was V's death 
a probable consequence?” Rather the question should be “Was D1's killing of V 
with malice aforethought a probable consequence?” 
  
In Kilindo it is, given the wide definition of malice aforethought, unlikely that the 
correct direction would have made any difference to the conviction for murder. 
  
V Post Script 
  
After having written this note (but before publishing it) the Court of Appeal gave 
its judgement in the case of Sopha v Republic SCA 11/2010. 
  
At [22] Fernando JA approved of statement of law in Kilindo (which I criticise in 
this note). However at [24] he states that for one “to be convicted of having 
committed murder, while prosecuting the offence of robbery; the words 'of such a 
nature' necessarily requires proof from an objective standpoint, of knowledge of 
the three elements required to constitute the offence of murder, namely, the 
causing of death, by an unlawful act or omission, with malice aforethought; and 
the probability of death ensuing in such circumstances.” 
  
Merely, showing that death was a probable consequence is then (as I argued) not 
enough. What is most interesting is the reference to knowledge. 
  
At [21] Fernando JA states “This brings in the element of knowledge i.e. 
knowledge on the part of the perpetrators as to the probable consequence of the 
prosecution of the offence they set out to commit. In such circumstances proof of 
the requisite intention on the part of the perpetrators, which may be an element 
of the other or second offence, need not be proved and proof of knowledge would 
suffice”. 
  
It is unclear what this means in terms of the direction for the jury. It could mean: 
1.      Did D2 know that D1 would kill V with malice aforethought? 
2.      Did D2 know that D1 killing V with malice aforethought was a 
probable consequence of the robbery? 
3.      Did D2 ought to have known that D1 would kill V with malice 
aforethought? 
4.      Did D2 ought to have known that D1 killing V with malice 
aforethought was a probable consequence of the robbery? (this seems to 
be the same as “Was D1's killing of V with malice aforethought a probable 
consequence?”) 
  
1 seems excluded by the reference to an objective test at [23] and [24]. 3 and 4 
actually seem equivalent (since whether there are a probable consequence is 
determined by what a reasonable person in D2's shoes would know). 
  
Clarification by the Court of Appeal on this point would be most welcome. 
  
At [23] Fernando JA states that the deeming provision of section 23 (“each of 
them is deemed to have committed the offence”) is in line with the derogation to 
the presumption of innocence provided for in Article 19(10)(b) of the 
Constitution. A detailed examination of that claim is beyond the scope of this note 
so I shall only make a few short observations. 
  
It is respectfully submitted that either section 23 is unconstitutional or it is not 
actually a limitation of the presumption of innocence and so does not need to be 
justified as being “necessary in a democratic society” (this requires a detailed 
proportionality analysis which the Court of Appeal did not undertake – see Tadros 
and Tierney (2004) and Dennis (2005)). 
  
Article 19(10)(b) applies to laws that “[declare] that the proof of certain facts 
shall be prima facie proof of the offence or of any element thereof”. By contrast 
the provision in section 23 is conclusive  and not prima facie. No evidence can be 
adduced to rebut it. Nor is it concerned with only certain elements of the offence 
of (say) murder. Once all the requirements of section 23 are met there is nothing 
more to prove for D2 to be guilty of murder. As such section 23 is not a permitted 
derogation to the presumption of innocence and it is therefore unconstitutional: 
Art 47(b). 
  
An alternative view is that Article 19(2)(a) (presumption of innocence) is not even 
engaged. This is because section 23 is actually not about evidence but about law. 
According to that view, as a matter of law, if D1 commits murder and the 
requirements of section 23 are met then D2 is guilty of an offence which the law 
terms murder. In other words, rather than “deeming” D2 to have committed 
murder the conventional way (i.e. actually killing someone himself with the 
required mens rea or aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring someone to do it), 
section 23 creates a new way of committing the offence of murder. On the debate 
about whether joint enterprise is a subset of accessorial liability see Virgo (2006) 
and Simester (2006). 
  
For that interpretation of section 23 not to engage Article 19(2)(a) (the 
presumption of innocence) it would have to be argued that the presumption of 
innocence under our Constitution is merely procedural and not substantive. For 
an argument that it is substantive see Tadros (2007). 
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*I am grateful to Professor Graham Virgo for having taught me criminal law 
and for his comments on this paper. All errors are, of course, my own. 
[i]      This was an appeal from Bermuda. Section 28 of the Penal Code of 
Bermuda is identical to Seychelles's. 
[ii]     We are assuming that the likelihood of a fit would be high enough to 
amount to a probable consequence. It is arguable in those circumstances that 
him going in the house of an old man would then be grossly negligent and so 
he would be guilty of gross negligence manslaughter. Even if that is so this 
does not detract from my point that D2 would not be guilty of murder. 
  
  
 
 
